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Real Property Tax Exemptions of Non-Profit
Organizations
Robert T. Bennett*

A

has been written about non-profit organizations in the area of state and local taxation, very little has
been written as to tax exemptions granted to these same organizations. This only indicates that the law on this subject is not
well developed and remains a source of constant litigation.
This situation appears to exist for several reasons. Each
state has its own tax statutes with its own definitions and interpretations, and litigation can usually be resolved by referring
only to the particular state constitution involved or the Constitution of the United States. There is a limited degree of exchanging of concepts and definitions among the states. This is
because case law follows the statutes and policies of the particular state involved; and consequently, little uniformity exists.
Other reasons are that local (county, township or municipal)
administration of these taxes might be at variance within the
state and that tax exemptions are granted for various reasons
and purposes by each individual state-what is exempt in one
state may not be exempt in another state.
LTHOUGH MUCH

Power To Exempt
It has been held that the power to tax includes the power to
exempt, unless prohibited by the state constitution.' Since the
so also is the power
power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty,
2
to grant exemptions from taxation.
Generally, these exemptions arise in several ways. State
constitutional provisions may provide for the exemptions. These
are usually self-executing, and the legislature has no authority
to interfere; but if the state constitution makes no provision for
the legislature then has the sole power
granting tax exemptions,
3
to grant them.
* B.S., Ohio State University; Certified Public Accountant; Cuyahoga
County (Cleveland) Ohio, Deputy Auditor, Supervisor, Property Tax Division; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of BaldwinWallace College.
1 In re assessment of First Nat. Bank of Chickasha, 58 Okla. 508, 160 P. 469
(1916).
2 For a general discussion in this area, see: 84 C. J. S. Taxation, Secs. 215
& 216; 51 Am. Jur. Taxation 500-503. See also 75 A. L. R. 2d 1106 (1961).
3 84 C. J. S. Taxation, Secs. 216-218; People ex rel. Buffalo and Fort Erie
Public Bridge Authority v. Davis, 277 N. Y. 292, 14 N. E. 2d 74 (1938). See
also State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N. E. 2d 684 (1937), where the Ohio
court quotes Corpus Juris on this subject.
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Between these two extremes, there are many degrees of
variance. Some state constitutions will allow the legislature to
grant exemptions at its discretion, in which case the exemption
arises only when the legislature takes action. However, the prevailing rule followed in 23 states, including Ohio, is that the
state constitution grants permissive authority to the legislature,
to make specific exemptions4 at its discretion, and specifically forbids all other exemptions.
This rule appears to be followed because the wording of the
constitution is usually clear in its provisions and tax exemptions
are intended to be exclusive.
Ownership vs. Use
Ownership is primarily the sole criterion used in exempting
governmental-owned property.5 For example, in the case of property owned by the United States, the general rule is that no
state has the authority to tax the federal government., Another
example of ownership as the main criterion used in determining
tax exemption, is property owned by a state and its political sub-7
divisions, including school districts and other special districts.

In some states, however, this may be limited to property devoted
to public use or purpose."
We can dispose of ownership as a sole criterion for tax exemption by stating that it is usually applicable only to governmental-owned property and usually has little bearing on other
non-profit organizations.
Ordinarily, under state constitutional and statutory provisions for exempting non-profit organizations from taxation, it
is the "use" of the property and not the "ownership" that determines the right to the exemption.
4 This rule is followed in:

Arizona
Illinois
North Carolina
Tennessee
Arkansas
Kentucky
Ohio
Utah
California
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Virginia
Colorado
Missouri
Oregon
Washington
Florida
Montana
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Georgia
Nevada
South Carolina
There has been a change in this rule in Alabama, Minnesota and South
Dakota. See, 84 C. J. S. Taxation, Sec. 220.
5 84 C. J. S. Taxation, Sec. 252.
6 Id. at 198.
7 Id. at 200.
s See, for example, N. Y. Real Prop. Tax L., Sec. 406 (1).

See also, Town
of Harrison v. County of Westchester, 13 N. Y. 2d 258, 196 N. E. 2d 240
(1962) where the Court of Appeals held that several aircraft hangars
owned by the county at the county airport, and leased to several private
corporations, were not tax exempt because they were not used for a public
purpose.
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Charitable Organizations
Religious, educational, hospital, library, civic organizations
and the like are said to be non-profit charitable organizations. 9
Generally, this type of organization is exempt from real property
taxation in all states. 10 However, most statutes exempting the
real property of these organizations state that the property must
be used for charitable purposes. 1 Therefore, "use" and not
"ownership" will determine the right to the exemption. 12 Thus,
in some states, if the property is being used by a lessee for exthe titled owner of the property can claim the
empt purposes,
13
exemption.
Other state statutes say that the property to be exempt must
be "owned and used" by the organization claiming the exemption; therefore, ownership and use must concur.' 1 Usually, property sitting idle or unused is not entitled to exemption, 15 and
exemption will not be inferred from the fact that a company
is organized for exempt purposes. 16
In many states, a non-exempt use will destroy the exempt
status of the property. 17 However, in other states, an incidental
use for non-exempt purposes, as distinguished from the primary
Other states
use, will not usually destroy the tax exemption.'
even go further and will permit exemption of that part of the
property used for exempt purposes while taxing the remainder. 19
It is interesting to note the similarities and differences that
exist among the various states in their granting of property tax
exemptions to certain types of non-profit organizations.
Inasmuch as California, Illinois, New York and Ohio are
probably the four most influential states in granting tax exemp9 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations and Associations 8 (2d ed.,
1965).
10 Id. at 437.
11 See, for example, Cal. Revenue & Tax. Code 17214; Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120,
Sec. 500.7; N. Y. Real Prop. Tax L., Sec. 420 (1); Ohio Rev. Code, Sec.
5709.12. See also Bowers v. Hadassah, 2 Ohio St. 2d 65, 206 N. E. 2d 201
(1965), where the court said, no exemptions allowed where there are no
substantial charitable activities in the state.
12 Ross v. City of Long Beach, 24 Cal. 2d 258, 148 P. 2d 649 (1944).
13 Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, 59 Neb. 571, 81 N. W. 624 (1900).
14 Douglas Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Douglas Cty., 104 Wis. 429, 80 N. W.
740 (1899).
15 Ohio Ursuline Academy v. Bd. of T. A., 141 Ohio St. 563, 49 N. E. 2d 674
(1943).
16 Wis. Catholic Woman's Club v. City of Green Bay, 180 Wis. 102, 192
N. W. 479 (1923).
17 Ohio Soc. of the Precious Blood v. B. T. A., 149 Ohio St. 62, 77 N. E. 2d
459 (1948).
18 People v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 137 N. E. 863 (1923).
19 Borough of Kittaning v. Armstrong County, 347 Pa. 108, 31 A. 2d 710

(1943).
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tions to non-profit organizations, these states have been chosen
for comparison.
(A) California
The California Constitution specifically provides 20for the exchurch, 2 1
emption of certain property such as governmental,
23
24
college, 22 orphanages and other sundry classifications. In addition, the constitution grants to the legislature power to exempt
from taxation, property25 used exclusively for religious, hospital
or charitable purposes.
In line with this permissive authority, California has enacted what is known as the welfare exemption law, which provides:
Property used exclusively for religious, hospital, scientific
or charitable purposes owned and operated by community
chests, funds, foundations or corporations organized and operated for religious, hospital, scientific, or charitable pur26
poses is exempt from taxation ....
The term "charitable," as used above, is defined by the California
courts to include property owned and operated by religious, hospital or charitable funds, foundations or corporations and
used
27
exclusively for school purposes below the college grades.
The welfare exemption law clearly provides that the property should be exclusively dedicated to religious and charitable
"purposes" rather than "uses." 28 Therefore, it would appear
that California leans more toward "purpose" than either "use"
or "ownership" in its specific exemptions. This is also shown to
be the case in other California exemption laws, as the word
''purpose" appears to be the deciding criterion.
This is best defined in the California test for determining
whether property is used exclusively for religious or charitable
purposes. The question is not whether the property is "essential, indispensable, and necessary," but rather "incidental to 29
and
reasonably necessary" for accomplishment of said purpose.
Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
Ibid., Sec. 1 .
22 Id., Sec. la.
23 Id., Sec. 1 a.
24 See other subdivisions under Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
25 Cal. Const. Art. XIII, Sec. ic.
26 Cal. Revenue & Tax. Code 17214.
27 Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P. 2d 1, appeal dism.
352 U. S. 921, 77 S. Ct. 224, 1 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1956).
28 House of Rest v. County of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. App. 2d 523, 312 P. 2d
392 (1957).
20
21

29

Ibid.
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Interpretations of the term "use" and "purposes" in California court decisions appear to be broader in scope than that intended by the statutes, as shown in the following cases.
California courts declared hospital property to be tax exempt, which property was devoted to the housing of essential
hospital personnel, to the conduct of a nurses' training school
operated in connection with the hospital, and to a tennis court
30
maintained as a recreational facility for hospital employees.
The entire retreat house of a qualified non-profit religious
institution was declared exempt, including that part used for
living quarters for priests and lay brothers, whose presences on
out the
the retreat property was deemed essential in 3carrying
1
religious and charitable activities of the retreat.
Property used principally for religious instruction and the
sale of religious books, the profit of which3 2was dedicated towards
religious purposes, was deemed exempt.
Portions of Y. M. C. A. buildings devoted to dormitory accommodations were declared exempt. The court stated that
there was no real profit motive, and that the dormitory portions
operated at a loss and were incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishments of the organization's religious and
charitable purposes. However, portions of Y. M. C. A. buildings
devoted to a restaurant, a barber shop, a valet shop and a "gym
store," all of which were open to the public as well as to
Y. M. C. A. members, and a meeting room where meals were
Selecserved to outside groups, and office rooms rented to the
33
tive Service Board, were not entitled to the exemption.
A non-profit corporation operating a home for aged people
on a "life care contract" basis, was entitled to the welfare exemption even though it required that each applicant pay an
entry fee for admission and meet the approval of the Board of
Directors after a three-month probationary period. There was
no element of private gain, and all the income of the corporation
was devoted exclusively to affording a reasonable standard of
care to the aged persons. 34 The portion of the corporation's
property used to house personnel, whose presence on its propan institutional necessity, was also entitled to the
erty constituted
35
exemption.
Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P. 2d 31 (1950).
31 Serra Retreat v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 755, 221 P. 2d 59 (1950).
32 St. Germain Foundation v. County of Siskiyou, 212 Cal. App. 2d 911, 28
Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963).
33 Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 760, 221
P. 2d 47 (1950).
34 Fredricka Home for Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P. 2d
68 (1950); Contra, see, Phila. Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio
St. 2d 135, 34 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 214 N. E. 2d 431 (1966).
35 Ibid.
30
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The above-mentioned cases give the impression that "intent"
along with "purpose" carries more weight in California than in
some of the other states.
The exemption statutes of California are not as numerous,
explicit, or as well defined as those of New York, Illinois or
Ohio. One of the reasons for this may be that it is a comparatively young state with a basically different population, economy
and political make-up; therefore, California tends to rely on her
courts for interpretation rather than be bound by the language
in a statute.
(B) Illinois
The Illinois Constitution provides that property used for
agriculture and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation;
but such exemptions shall be only by general law.36
This constitutional provision grants to the legislature authority to enact legislation for tax exemption within stated
limits. It does not in itself exempt any property.3 7 Therefore,
the enumeration in the constitution of certain classes of property which may be exempted from taxation is a limitation upon
the power of the legislature to exempt any other property, and
it is beyond the power of the legislature to add to or broaden
these exemptions.3 8
As a result of this constitutional provision, the Illinois statutes relating to non-profit organizations are similar to the California welfare exemption law in that the main criterion for
exemption in most cases is "use." 39 However, in the case of
religious institutions, the statutes specify that all property used
exclusively for religious purposes, or for orphanages, including
property owned by churches, or religious institutions, including
housing facilities for everyone whose vocation is connected with
the church or institution, shall be exempt. 40 Thus, it would appear that in the matter of granting tax exemptions to religious
institutions, Illinois leans more towards "ownership" as a criterion; although property used for religious purposes would also
be exempt. Ownership in this sense would be broader in scope,
in that it would cover property used for housing of personnel or
held for future needs as they might arise.
A separate statute exempts all property of "beneficent"
and "charitable" organizations, including institutions of public
Ill. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 3.
People ex rel. Gill v. Trustees of Schools, 364 I1. 131, 4 N. E. 2d 16
(1936).
38 Locust Grove Cemetery Ass'n of Philo v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 156 N. E.
2d 577 (1959).
39 Supra n. 26; see also Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, Sec. 500.
40 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 120, Sec. 500.2.
30
37
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charity, when such property is used exclusively for charitable
or beneficent purposes. One exception to the statute is that any
hospital which has been found guilty, by a court of law, of
having denied admission to any person because of his race, color
or creed, will not be entitled to the exemption."1
Two things are absolutely essential before the property may
be exempt from taxation. It must be owned by a charitable insti42
tution, and it must be used exclusively for charitable purposes.
The mere fact that a charitable institution owns a certain property, or uses the property, is not enough for it to warrant exemption. 4 3 This is a good example where "ownership" and "use"
must concur.
Whereas California courts would look to "use" or "purposes"
in construing her statutes, Illinois courts appear to deal more
with what is charity and what is not charity. "Use" of the property is also considered by the courts, but this does not appear to
be as much a problem as in some states; and they have held that
what is for public good and what is for public purposes are
questions to be determined first by the legislature, and they
is evasive of or
will not interfere unless the legislative action
44
contrary to some constitutional prohibition.
Charitable purposes, as defined by the Illinois courts, in a
broad sense means an application of property for the benefit
of an indefinite number of persons by relieving them of one or
more forms of hardship, by assisting them to help themselves,
45
and thus generally lessening the burdens of government.
The mere fact that property is held by an institution of public charity is insufficient to exempt it from taxation. Said property must be in actual use by the institution in carrying out its
charitable purposes. 4 6 It is proper procedure to consider the
determine if
provisions of an organization's charter in order to
47
the said organization is charitable in its purpose.
In all cases, it is incumbent upon the property owner to
show clearly that its organization and use of property come with41 Ibid., Sec. 500.7. See also People ex rel. Greer v. Thomas Walters Chapter of D. A. R., 311 I1. 304, 142 N. E. 566 (1924); People ex rel. Nelson v.
Rockford Lodge No. 64, B. P. 0. E., 348 Ill. 528, 181 N. E. 432 (1932), where
the courts held "beneficent" to mean same as "charitable."
42 Rogers Park Post No. 108, American Legion v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 286, 134
N. E. 2d 292 (1956).
43 International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 141, 133 N. E. 2d
269 (1956). See similar decisions in Trustees of Wofford College v. City of
Spartanburg, 201 S. C. 315, 23 S. E. 2d 9 (1942); New Orphans' Asylum
of Colored Children of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219,
80 N. E. 2d 761 (1948).
44 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port Dist., 4 Ill. 2d 363,
123 N. E. 2d 92 (1955).
45 Coyne Elec. School v. Paschen, 12 Ill.
2d 387, 146 N. E. 2d 73 (1957).
46 International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, supra note 43.
47 Rotary International v. Paschen, 14 IIl. 2d 480, 153 N. E. 2d 4 (1958).
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in the provisions of the statutes exempting charitable organizations from taxation. The burden of48proving this right to exemption rests entirely with the owner.
The consequence for not fulfilling this obligation is the
loss of tax exemption, as illustrated in the case of a national
fraternal organization. The local clubs of said organization were
actively engaged in charitable and educational programs, but
failed to establish proof that its national headquarters building
was entitled 4to
the property tax exemption as being a charitable
9
organization.
In granting exemptions to property used for public educational purposes, a private institution seeking tax exemption as
a school must first offer a course of study which fits into the
general scheme of education followed by Illinois, and must offer
a course which substantially
lessens what would otherwise be a
50
governmental obligation.
It has been held that the primary use of school property,
and not its incidental uses, is the determining factor for its tax
exemption status. 51 The real estate of a physical education society which conducted classes in swimming and gymnastics was
not granted tax exemption as such, for the activities by themselves were not sufficient to bring the society
within the meaning
52
of "schools" as defined in the statutes.
In summary, the Illinois statutes exempting property from
taxation must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by
judicial interpretation.53 The provisions granting tax exemptions must come not only within the terms of the statute but also
within the authority given by the constitution, in determining
whether the property in question is included within the scope of
tax exemption. 54 However, all debatable questions are to be resolved in favor of taxation and against the exemption. 5 5 The
legislature has the sole authority in Illinois to create exemption
from taxation and the courts 56are powerless to extend exemption by judicial interpretation.
48

Milward v. Paschen, 16 Iln. 2d 302, 157 N. E. 2d 1 (1959).

49

Kiwanis International v. Lorenz, 23 111. 2d 141, 177 N. E. 2d 220 (1961).

50 Milward v. Paschen, supra n. 48.
51 People ex rel. Kelly v. Avery Coonley School, 12 Ill. 2d 113, 145 N. E. 2d
80 (1957).
52 People ex rel. Brenza v. Turnverein Lincoln, B Ill. 2d 198, 132 N. E. 2d
499 (1956).
53 Follet's Illinois Book & Supply Store, Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Iln. 2d 600, 190
N. E. 2d 324 (1963).
54 Rogers Park Post, etc. v. Brenza, supra n. 42.
55 Ibid.

56 Follet's Ill. Book & Supply Store, Inc. v. Isaacs, supra n. 53.
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(C) New York
The New York constitution provides that tax exemptions
may be granted only by the legislature, and it does not provide
for any specific exemptions. However, exemptions granted to
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable
purposes as defined by law, or owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted5 7exclusively for such purposes,
may not be altered or repealed.
One can readily see that the constitution of New York
grants an extremely broad power to the legislature in the area
of tax exemption. It does not state certain classes of property to
be exempt, nor does it prohibit exemption. Thus, it is well
settled that in New York it is within the power of the legislature
to determine what real property is to be exempt. However, the
courts have applied the rule of strict construction whereby the
exemption must be clearly expressed in the statute and not just
implied.5 9
In the State of New York, real property owned by a corporation or association which is organized for either religious,
charitable, educational, scientific, or similar purposes, and which
is being used exclusively for such purposes, is exempt; however, the operations of these organizations must be on a strictly
non-profit basis. 59
A New York hospital was first organized as a profit organization and, several years later, reorganized as a non-profit organization, seeking tax exemption. A New York City tax assessor denied the exemption, with the lower court upholding
this decision, stating that no genuine claim to charity could
exist because the hospital accepted a limited number of free
patients, appearing to "just get by" for the exemption. The appellate court overruled these decisions and granted exemption
by stating that the legal meaning of charitable purposes is not
necessarily limited to free services to the poor, that hospitals devoted to the care of the sick and where contributions are made
to the advancement of medical science, are rightly charitable.30
Thus, in New York "ownership" and "use" are both necessary criteria of the tax exemption, but "ownership" and "use"
must also concur.
The courts have consistently held that any corporation or
association that attempts to qualify for tax exemption, under the
exclusive organization section of the statute, must meet all the
57 N. Y. Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 1.
58 Application of Ladycliff College, 226 A. D. 753, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 149 (1943),

affd. without op. 293 N. Y. 712, 56 N. E. 2d 729 (1944). See also People
ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc., Inc. v. Mastin, 191 Misc. 899, 80
N. Y. S. 2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
59 N. Y. Real Prop. Tax L., Sec. 420(1).
60 People ex rel. Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Sexton, 267 A. D. 736, 48 N. Y. S.
2d 201 (1944), affd. without op. 295 N. Y. 553, 64 N. E. 2d 273 (1945).
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requirements and specifications laid down by the statute. 6 1 All
of the purposes for which the corporation or association was
organized must be exclusively exempt purposes and must be
62
within the meaning of the statute.
If some of the purposes of the corporation or association are
not exempt purposes, then the corporation or association forfeits its right to tax exemption under the statute. 6 3 For example,
if a corporation is organized for religious purposes and also for
social purposes, then it does not qualify for tax exemption under
the exclusive organization section of the statute, as social purposes are not
exempt purposes, even though religious purposes
64
are exempt.

An association had headquarters in Brooklyn and was the
governing body of Jehovah's Witnesses.

The group owned a

large home in Brooklyn which served as a dormitory for the
employees of its large printing plant. The group owned several
farms in another county, to grow food for this home, and sought
tax exemption of these farms for the 1947 tax year. They
claimed that all people working for the group were ministers.
Exemption was denied. One reason was that only a small percentage of food was grown and consumed by the group; the
large surplus was being sold in the market at a handsome profit.
The court also stated that exemption statutes must be construed
strictly, and property used partially for exempt purposes and
partly for non-exempt purposes is wholly subject to taxation.6 5
However, in 1956, this same group asked for exemption on this
same property for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. The tax
assessor denied the exemption on the same basis as the previous
case. The court, however, granted the exemption, stating that the
facts were different in that a large surplus of food was not being
sold on the open market; and that in this case, the 5 to 10 percent
sold was considered an incidental and insubstantial amount.
The court went on to say that the exemption statute should not
be interpreted so narrowly as to defeat its settled purpose.66
The statutes also require that real property owned by a
corporation which is organized exclusively for exempt purposes
61 American-Russian Aid Ass'n. v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 622, 246
N. Y. S. 2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Kings County Pharmaceutical Soc. v. City
of New York, 204 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (1960).
62 People ex rel. Chamber of Commerce of State of New York v. Mills, 188
Misc. 593, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 231, affd. without op. 272 A. D. 804, 71 N. Y. S. 2d
896 (1947); Great Neck Section, etc., v. Board of Assessors, 21 Misc. 2d 189,
189 N. Y. S. 2d 623 (1959); see also In Re Syracuse Masonic Temple, 270
N. Y. 8, 199 N. E. 780 (1936).
63 Ibid.

64 Application of Peace Haven, etc., 175 Misc. 753, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 974 (1941);
see also Great Neck v. Board of Assessors, supra n. 62.
65 People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Mastin, supra n. 58.
66 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Haring, 8 N. Y. 2d 350, 207
N. Y. S. 2d 673, 170 N. E. 2d 677 (1960).
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must be used exclusively for those exempt purposes laid down
in the statutes. 6 7 This means that all of the uses of the property
must be for exempt purposes. Any portion of real property
owned by an exempt corporation that is not used exclusively for
tax exempt purposes is taxable, even though the corporation
itself may be exempt. 8 This is an instance of "use" prevailing
over "ownership."
New York courts have held that corporation property is entitled to exemption where such property is necessary to the
carrying out of the corporation's exempt purposes, even though
such property is incidental to the overall corporate purposes. 9
The courts have also held that in situations where residences
must be furnished for faculty members of educational corporations, such residences are entitled to exemption. 70 In another
case, it was ruled that apartment buildings which are owned by
a New York hospital for housing the hospital staff were entitled
to tax exemption; 71 however, if any portion of real property is
not being used by an exempt corporation for any purpose, but
is held for possible future use or is being used with a view to
profit, then such property or portion of it would not be tax exempt.72

Again, we see an instance of "use" prevailing over

"ownership," but both depending upon each other.
To summarize the requirements of this statutory provision
on exemption laws in New York, we can say that property must
be owned by a corporation or association, and such corporation
or association must be organized exclusively for exempt purposes within the meaning of the statute. An organization is
either all charitable or all non-charitable. A partial tax cannot be levied upon a partially charitable organization. In addition to the corporation being run on a non-profit basis, the property owned must be used exclusively for exempt purposes.
(D)

Ohio

The Ohio constitution permits the enactment of general
laws exempting from taxation public property used exclusively
for public purposes, cemeteries, school houses, houses used ex67 Good Will Club of Amsterdam New York, Inc. v. City of Amsterdam, 31
Misc. 2d 1096, 222 N. Y. S. 2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
68 Town of Harrison v. County of Westchester, supra n. 8.

69 See, for example, St. Luke's Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N. Y. 2d 135, 237
N. Y. S. 2d 308, 187 N. E. 2d 769 (1962).
70 Clarkson Memorial College of Technology v. Haggert, 191 Misc. 621, 77
N. Y. S. 2d 182, affd. without op. 300 N. Y. 595, 89 N. E. 2d 882 (1949); New
York University v. Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, 304 N. Y.
124, 106 N. E. 2nd 44 (1952); see also Pratt Institute v. Boyland, 16 Misc. 2d
58, 174 N. Y. S. 2d 112, affd. 8 A. D. 2d 625, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 753 (1959) where
court also included other administrative employees.
71 St. Luke's Hospital v. Boyland, supra n. 69.
72 Ibid.
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clusively for public
purposes, and institutions used exclusively
73
for public charity.
The Ohio statutes are very detailed and explicit as to what
property is to be tax exempt. In fact, it appears that in the case
of charitable institutions, the statutes are more restrictive than
the constitutional provisions. For instance, the Code provides for
tax exemption of property, "belonging" to institutions, that is
used exclusively for charitable purposes. Thus, the statute introduces
an "ownership" factor that is not present in the consti74
tution.
In line with this statute, the Ohio Attorney General ruled in
1928 that property, to be exempted from taxation must, in addition to being used exclusively for charitable purposes, be titled
in the institution's name. 75 The courts have supported this ruling,
by stating that in the case of private property leased to a charitable institution whose property is exempt, this does not cause
the leased property to be exempt, even though the institution
may have arrived at an agreement with the lessor to pay the
taxes.76 However, if property that is already tax exempt because of its charitable uses is sold, but possession is retained and
such uses continued pending payment of the purchase price, the
vendors continue to be the owners under the tax laws until payment is final. An agreement by the vendee to pay taxes means
only legal tax and does not affect the right to exemption. 77
Thus, it is clear that the rule in Ohio regarding charitable
organizations parallels that of New York and Illinois, in that
"ownership" and "use" must concur.
The courts in Ohio, as in the above states, usually must interpret the terms "use," "purposes," or "charity" within the
meaning of the statute. The following situations will illustrate
some of the difficulties the Ohio courts have had in applying these
terms.
The courts have held that the "use" of property exclusively
for charitable purposes is the criterion for tax exemption.78
Thus, where the exercise of private rights constitutes the primary use of property owned by a charitable institution, a charitable purpose is no longer the primary function of the property. 79
73

Ohio Const. Art. XII, Sec. 2.

74 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5709.12.

1928 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) 2327.
Humphries v. Little Sisters of Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201 (1876).
77 Emily W. Myers v. Albert E. Akins, Auditor, 8 Ohio C. C. 228, 4 Ohio
C. D. 425 (Cir. Ct. 1894).
78 In re Complaint of Taxpayers, 138 Ohio St. 287, 34 N. E. 2d 748 (1941);
East End Hospital v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 608, 41 N. E. 2d 569 (1942); Wehrle
Foundation v. Evatt, 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N. E. 2d 52 (1943); Hospital
Service Assoc. v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179, 57 N. E. 2d 928 (1944).
79 Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133,
91 N. E. 2d 497 (1950).
75
76
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The test for the exemption of certain property claimed to
be used for charitable purposes is the present use of the property.80 If the property is appropriated to uses other than a
charitable purpose, then the exemption is forfeited.8 1 This holds
true even if the property is used to produce income, though the
income may be used exclusively for charitable purposes.8 2 Thus,
property held by a merely non-profit organization to produce income for the purpose of distribution to certain charitable, religious, scientific or educational organizations, is not entitled to
property exemption under the statute.8 3 Also, charitable propor resierty will not be exempt if it is rented for a commercial
84
dential purpose, this not being a charitable use.
In Ohio, hospitals generally are treated as charitable institutions devoted exclusively to charitable purposes, as they usually
meet the necessary requirements of caring for the poor, needy
and distressed who may be unable to pay. However, where a
hospital extends its facilities and services largely to those who
are able to pay established rates for their accommodations, and
makes a profit in so doing, it becomes a business enterprise liable to taxation although many unfortunates may have been
cared for free of any charges. Even if this profit is used for the
purpose of paying off indebtedness and for improving and enlarging its facilities, it still does not become a tax exempt charitable institution; it is use of property and not use of proceeds
which is the criterion of tax exemption. 5
By strict construction of tax exemption statutes, property
used for residential purposes has been generally held not to be
exempt, even though owned by a charitable organization in furtherance of its charitable purposes. This applies to church-owned
parish houses.86 But, an Ohio statute provides that property used
80 Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc. v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St.

185, 42 N. E. 2d 900 (1942); Battelle, Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio
St. 53, 73 N. E. 2d 88 (1947); Orphans' Asylum v. Board, 150 Ohio St. 219,
80 N. E. 2d 761 (1948); Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 359,
131 N. E. 2d 219 (1955).
81 Goldman v. Bentley Post, 158 Ohio St. 205, 107 N. E. 2d 528 (1952).
82 Orphans' Asylum v. Board, supra n. 80.
83 Wehrle Foundation v. Evatt, supra n. 78.
84 Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N. E. 924 (1915);
court discusses the history of legislation and adjudications with respect to
exemptions. State ex rel. Boss v. Hess, 113 Ohio St. 52, 148 N. E. 347 (1925).
85 Cleveland Osteopathic Hospital v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 91 N. E. 2d
261 (1950). But, see Vick v. Cleveland Memorial Medical Foundation,
2 Ohio St. 2d 30, 209 N. E. 2d 127, cert. den. 382 U. S. 956 (1965); court
granted exemption, even though hospital had surplus from patient charges;
however, no part of surplus was diverted to private profit.
86 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874); See also Watterson v. Holliday,
77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N. E. 962 (1907); Ohio Society of the Precious Blood v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 62, 77 N. E. 2d 459 (1948).
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for non-exempt purposes may be split from tax exempt prop87
erty.
In cases of property devoted to recreational uses, it has
been held that land belonging to a charitable institution, which
is used as an athletic field or playground for students of the institution, is tax exemptss This rule, however, appears to have
been stretched recently where the court held that land owned by
a local chamber of commerce was exempt because the property
was devoted to a public use as a recreation park, which is a
charitable purpose. What is disturbing about this case is that the
court stated that the chamber of commerce is an "institution"
within the meaning of the exemption statute, even though it was
not organized exclusively for charitable purposes.8 9
In some states, veterans' organizations are considered charitable in purpose. 90 In Ohio, these organizations are not considered to be exclusively used for charitable purposes so as to
come within the provisions of the Code applicable to property
devoted to charitable purposes. Ohio, however, makes a special
consideration in the Code, declaring that real estate held or occupied by a war veterans' organization, which is organized exclusively for charitable services and incorporated under the law
of the state or the United States, except property used with a
view to income, shall be exempt from taxation.9 1 However, it
exhas been ruled that property of such organizations not used
92
clusively for charitable purposes cannot be exempted.
Most states include schools and churches within their charitable tax exemption laws, but Ohio provides a separate statute to
cover "public school houses" and "houses used for public worship." Again, it appears that "ownership" and "use" must concur.

93

It is interesting to note that Ohio courts have held all universities to be public within the meaning of the statute, saying
that "public" does not refer to ownership, but to the use to which
the property is put. 94 This rule has also been extended to dormitories for students at private colleges. 95 With the Ohio statute
Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5713.04.
College Preparatory School for Girls v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 408, 59 N. E.
2d 142 (1945).
89 Bryan Chamber of Commerce v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d
195, 214 N. E. 2d 812 (Mar. 1966).
90 See, for example, Cal. Revenue & Tax. Code 17215.
91 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5709.17.
92 National Headquarters, Disabled American Veterans v. Bowers, 171 Ohio
St. 312, 170 N. E. 2d 731 (1960).
93 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5709.07.
94 Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St. 2d 17, 205 N. E.
2d 896 (1965).
95 Thomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 182, 214 N. E. 231 (Feb.
1966).
87

88
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being so specific, the courts have not looked for "organization
purpose" when considering requests for tax exemption, but look
only to the use to which the property is put. 96
In summary, the Ohio law closely parallels New York in
that the exemption statutes are very specific as to what is and
what is not exempt. Whereas New York follows the rule of strict
construction, Ohio courts appear to be more lenient in interpreting their state statutes, with California and Illinois being
even more liberal in their granting of tax exemptions.
Merely Non-Profit Organizations
Trade associations (labor unions, chambers of commerce and
the like), political organizations and social organizations (including fraternal orders, mutual benefit societies and the like),
97
are sometimes referred to as "merely non-profit" organizations.
These organizations are usually taxable to a greater extent than
charitable organizations.9 s However, it would be impossible to
even begin comparing the various state statutes as to which of
these organizations might be exempt or non-exempt.
In general, most states provide real property tax exemptions
to certain "merely non-profit" organizations, but not to all such
organizations.99 In some cases, if a portion of the real property of
a merely non-profit organization is devoted to a charitable use or
purpose, it may be exempt; but this would depend entirely upon
the particular state involved and its tax exemption statutes. 100
If such a statute exists, it will usually be clear and explicit in its
language.
California, New York, Illinois and Ohio exempt the real property of some "merely non-profit" organizations, either by statute
or by court interpretation, putting certain property or organizations into what amounts to a charitable classification. 1 1 However, reference must be made to that particular state's constitution, statutes and case law before determining what is to be
exempt in a particular case.
96 Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra n. 94.
97 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations and Associations, ch. 1
(2d ed. 1965), for discussion of "Nature and Classification of Non-Profit
Organizations."
98 Id. at 435, State Exemptions for Non-Profit Organizations.
99 See, for example, Cal. Revenue & Tax. Code 17215, 17221; Ill. Rev. Stat.,
Ch. 120, Sec. 500.10, 500.12, 500.18; N. Y. Real Prop. Tax L., Sec. 422-489;
Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 5709.13, 5709.15, 5709.18.
100 See, for example, Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5709.17.
101 Bryan Chamber of Commerce v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra n. 89
where court held chamber of commerce to be an "institution," using property for charitable purposes within the meaning of the statute (Ohio Rev.
Code, Sec. 5709.12).
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Conclusion
Needless to say, volumes could be written on the subject of
granting real property tax exemptions to non-profit organizations. These organizations, already very numerous, are rapidly
multiplying and spreading over the entire country. One exemption in itself may appear quite harmless; however, looking back
to the turn of the century, it appears that one exemption has
led to another, until now countless thousands of properties have
attained tax exempt status.
As only a limited number of states keep actual figures, approximations must be used, but it is generally agreed that there
is an enormous difference between the total value of all property
10 2
in the United States and the value of property actually taxed.
Very few localities have made an effort to investigate the
situation or to suggest remedies; however, in 1964, the Cuyahoga County Auditor (in Cleveland, Ohio) conducted a countywide reappraisal program. It was discovered that over 21% of
all real property in Cleveland and 17% of the entire county's
property was tax exempt.' 0 3 The approximate market value of
10 4
Of this
this exempt property was over two billion dollars.
amount, over 40% represented exempt property owned by nongovernmental agencies, which would normally be classified as
charitable institutions. 10 5
In the matter of exemptions for non-profit religious, charitable and educational institutions, it is almost traditional that
these organizations be given tax exempt status; because they are
performing services for the public which ordinarily would have
to be undertaken by the government. Many authorities believe,
however, that the institutional tax exemption has been used,
and abused, far beyond its basic purpose, as it has become a
simple task for almost any organization, involved to some degree with charitable, religious, cultural or educational pursuits,
to achieve tax exempt status.
U. S. Bureau of Census, "Property Tax Assessments in the United
States," showing aggregate of locally taxable assessed valuation to be
$355.7 billion in 1961 (inclusive of intangibles); as compared with an
estimated national wealth by National Bureau of Economic Research of
$1,682.1 billion in 1958. The contrast is not as extreme as the figures indicate, because of Fractional Assessment, but it is still quite large. See also
"Inventory Report on Real Property owned by the United States throughout the World," prepared by General Services Administration, as of June
30, 1965; showing cost of property owned by the Federal Government in tho
United States to be $58.8 billion.
103 "Report of Reappraisal of all Exempt Real Property in Cuyahoga
County" for 1964 Tax Year. See also Philada v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5
Ohio St. 2d 135, 214 N. E. 2d 431 (Feb. 1966), where court noted that 13%
of all property in Ohio is tax exempt.
104 Based on report received from Mr. Ralph J. Perk, Cuyahoga County
Auditor; showing taxable assessed value to be approximately 40% of market
value.
105 Cuyahoga County, Reappraisal Report, supra n. 103.
102
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Another reason given for all the various exemptions that
now exist is the goal of tax justice, i.e., some organizations are
better able to pay taxes than others. Unfortunately, the easing
of the tax burden on one organization puts an undue increase
on the tax burden of other organizations or individuals.
It has been established that many tax exemptions are the
direct result of action of pressure groups influencing certain politicians or legislators. These exemptions not only create inequities
or special privileges, but they unnecessarily complicate the tax
systems, with increases in administrational expense.
There is some thought that tax exemption is a poor method
of providing aid to the aforementioned institutions. In some instances, a community must bear the exemption for an institution
serving a much wider area, because exemptions must be absorbed
by individual local tax bases.
Moreover, legislatures are imposing forced contributions on
taxpayers without their consent and outside the processes of local
budgets. It is clear that the various state legislatures must review the area of property tax exemptions in order to bring about
some semblance of uniformity and equality.
It has beeen suggested that perhaps outright government
grants may be the answer to tax exemption, together with the
abolition of exemptions for which grants could not be justified. 10 6
However, a more forthright solution would appear to be the
abolition of all non-governmental property tax exemptions, completely. Otherwise, in time we will come to the point where most
property, except that belonging to the small home owner, will
be exempt from taxation.
106

For a general discussion of the historical reasoning behind property tax

exemptions and the limits to further extension of such exemptions, see,
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Role of the
States in Strengthening the Property Tax, Vol. 1, Ch. 8 (June 1963).
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